Times, as we know, do not choose... Nikolai Ryzhkov headed the USSR Council of Ministers in difficult years, when the country was at a crossroads, not knowing “where should we go.” A man with enormous experience, the general director of a major machine-building plant, he was until recently working on a farm in a huge and already collapsing state. Was it possible to prevent the collapse, retain Crimea for Russia, protect the people from the experiments of Yeltsin’s young reformers - Alexander Sargin talks about this with the last chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
Death of an Empire
In Soviet times, there were many people from Ukraine in the country's leadership. So you, Nikolai Ivanovich, were born in the Donetsk region...
— To be honest, I don’t consider Donbass Ukraine. Geographically, yes. It so happened that this region ended up there. But Donbass is dismembered: approximately two-thirds of it is located on the territory of Ukraine and one-third is on the territory of the Rostov region. I don’t know how it is now, but in not so long ago Soviet times there were about 75%, if not 80, Russians, and very few Ukrainians. Donbass is actually Russian. We didn’t even really think about the fact that this was Ukraine.
But now Ukraine and Russia are two independent states...
— Ukraine has always been part of Russia. As such, there was no Ukraine at all, but during Soviet rule there was the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It so happened that in our country we go through border guards, through customs officers. They tell us that this is Ukraine, and this is Russia. I can't wrap my head around it! We were born, lived and worked in a single state. And take him and dismember him like that...
There was also Crimea...
— Well, Crimea is a special matter. I think Nikita Sergeevich was in some special state when he gave up Crimea. By the way, Boris Nikolaevich too. When they gathered in Belovezhye in 1990, if they were normal, and not drunk, he would have thought first...
I read somewhere that, on the contrary, they were sober, which is more surprising for making such a decision.
- Why sober? Everyone knows perfectly well that this is not so. After all, they drank for every line, and much has already been written on this issue. I read many materials, including those by Kravchuk, who was then in power. He said frankly: we, they say, that Yeltsin will raise the issue of Sevastopol and Crimea. And, as far as I understand, they believed that in the name of Ukraine’s independence they would have to sacrifice Sevastopol, they would have to give it up. But Yeltsin did not raise this question, and they breathed a sigh of relief. But Yeltsin was obliged to raise this question! Well, okay, Khrushchev did the wrong thing then, but at that time we were one country, and it was not very painful. But when we became different states... Crimea was Russian all its life, and Sevastopol had a special status. I didn’t come up with this; the status of special allied subordination to Sevastopol was granted by Stalin after the war. There are documents - by the way, no one thought to cancel them. Many people are either lying or really don’t know.
What, in your opinion, is the main reason for the collapse of the USSR - Gorbachev’s compliance, his inability to resist the West, the Belovezhskaya conspiracy, or really some objective circumstances that launched an irreversible process?
“Over these twenty years, many different arguments and justifications have been given. Here someone, out of ignorance or thoughtlessness, says: “The Roman Empire fell apart, Austria-Hungary fell apart, Great Britain fell apart...” They say, such is the fate of empires, sooner or later they all fall apart. Then I have a question: isn’t the USA an empire? It's just that this country is called differently. They have 50 states, but in reality they are the same republics as the 15 republics of the former USSR. And try to say in a conversation with the American president or some other politician that sooner or later they will fall apart. Such a cry will rise!
But the USSR was divided into republics based on nationality, it turned out that this was a time bomb! The US has a different approach.
- Yes, it's a mine! I wondered: why did Lenin do this? He was not a stupid man and understood everything perfectly, but he followed this path. Stalin insisted on administrative division. By the way, Zhirinovsky is now offering the same thing, he says: there are no Kalmyks, Tatars there... There is simply a Kazan region or some other...
I think Lenin was sure that nothing like that would happen, because after
After the civil war, only one party remained - the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), then the CPSU. The party lived and worked according to the principle of democratic centralism, only from top to bottom, and this was written down in all the charters. Lenin understood perfectly well that, for example, from the primary party organization of Ukraine to the central apparatus in Moscow, everything was built vertically. And the party did not take into account anything, any administrative or national-geographical divisions. He understood that the party would hold the country. And this binding factor was considered stronger, more of a priority, perhaps, than the “right of nations to self-determination”
But objectively, the USSR was not a survivor?
- I have a completely different opinion. The USSR is a monolithic single state. Yes, there were union republics, but there was also a policy towards the union republics. There was a party, and it held everything in its hands: Ukraine, keep in mind that according to the party line you are subordinate to Moscow and try to do something! And, of course, there was a different personnel policy. My second secretary in Georgia was a friend of mine, now deceased. The head of the republic was always a person of the titular nationality, and the second secretary was always a nominee of Moscow, the center. And when in 1986 they did something stupid and put a Russian, Gennady Vasilyevich Kolbin, at the head of Kazakhstan (we lived and worked with him in the Urals), then big troubles happened: rallies, young people rioted. I believe this was a management mistake. In my opinion, Ligachev then dragged him through, thinking that since the majority there were Russians and Germans, then why put a Kazakh in charge... That’s what fired. By the way, this was the first shot during perestroika. Both Georgia and the Baltic states existed later, and there was no Yeltsin yet.
The Messiah is coming
Gaidar wrote in his book that at a certain point Gorbachev began to take out politically related loans. That is, dismantling the system in exchange for certain preferences. How important do you think this was?
“I don’t know if the formulation that Gorbachev took the money in order to destroy the Soviet Union is even correct. I don't think that was the case. Of course, there were some private agreements - for example, the same withdrawal of troops from the GDR... But first there was a political decision to withdraw them, and then, so to speak, financial mechanisms also came into play. By the way, they clutched their stomachs when they found out the amount we charged them for the unification of Germany, it was so meager. I don’t remember now, in my opinion, 16 billion dollars... Yes, we were paid money, but if you take into account what costs we incurred, what transportation costs... When all this began, I spoke with Defense Minister Yazov. He very much complained that we were forced to export some of the troops, equipment and people by sea, because it was unprofitable to drive trains through the GDR and especially through Poland. There are such prices for each axle of a railway car that there was not enough money!
But, you know, with all my disrespect for Gorbachev, for what he did, I still have hope in my soul to some extent, some small confidence that he did not raise the question of destroying the country. He raised the question of the unification of Germany, disarmament, dialogue with the West...
How critical was the situation? Was it impossible to prevent the collapse?
“At first she wasn’t critical. But they made her like this. In 1990, I did not leave the podium and said: “What are you doing? Stop!” The country had already gone into chaos in 1990, and we were absolutely not prepared for the next year. In our country, everything was interconnected, and Ukraine says: give us new equipment, but does not offer anything in return... With such a mess that was in 1990, it was difficult to expect anything at all. In August, Gorbachev returned from vacation from the south, and I asked him to meet. He received me and all my deputies. I said that the country is no longer governable today, and no one listens to anyone. Yeltsin says: “Give me the gold, give me the currency, and I won’t pay any taxes.” He came up with single-channel taxes, that is, he collects everything, and then says, well, for culture I’ll give you a piece, for defense I’ll give you a piece... By the way, today there are two channels - regional and federal. Then we prepared a short decision that the budget for 1991 is formed according to the same principle as all previous years. Lord, how they beat me then - there was no living space left on me! What happened!
Instead of figuring it out, they pulled out the “500 days” program and started messing with it. I say: listen, what are you talking about 500 days, when you somehow have to live today and tomorrow!?
Gerashchenko once said that Yavlinsky borrowed this program from Abalkin. There were not 500 days, but 400 step-by-step solutions...
- This is nonsense! What kind of economy could we talk about in 1990, when, in fact, everything got out of control? In general, I thought a lot about all these reforms that took place, for example, in China in 1979, and in other countries. Everywhere they were carried out under strong government. We started everything correctly and started working on the economy. And perestroika was proclaimed to modernize the economy. It was then, a couple of years later, that they said that the economy was not enough, that the political and government system needed to be changed. I believe that Gorbachev simply succumbed to the West, which praised him, said that he was the messiah, Gorbi, Gorbi... And Yakovlev was an eminence grise.
It seems Gorby still believes that he is the messiah...
“He believed that he descended from somewhere 2000 years after Jesus Christ, so he decided to do everything. I remember a conversation with Thatcher, with whom during her visit, like now with you, we sat face to face. She told me: “Mr. Ryzhkov, you are doing something very stupid!” I ask, which one? “Gorbachev wants to eliminate atomic weapons...” We really, to some extent, naively thought that too many reserves had accumulated and that the world might collapse. She then said: “Mr. Ryzhkov, you are doing this in vain. Understand, only thanks to atomic weapons we do not have a world war.” And when I thought about her words, I realized how right she was. Everyone understands perfectly well that no one will be the first to press the button, but everyone knows that such a button exists. There is a suitcase, there is a button, there are missiles (though Yeltsin later redirected them to God knows where!).
By the way, Thatcher later said in her memoirs that when Gorbachev came again, pulled out a map, showed the missile points and told how the missiles would be targeted, they were simply shocked! They would never have believed it and thought it was a provocation. After all, the head of state cannot reveal all his cards to another country!
With all that he has done, I still think that his main negative role is that through his actions (not at one moment, this lasted for several years) he led to the fact that the process became irreversible.
Russian with Chinese...
Do you regret that we did not follow the Chinese path?
- I'm sorry. About five years after my resignation, I was invited several times by the Chairman of the Chinese Government, Li Peng, and in the end I flew there. They organized a trip around the country for me, and I talked a lot with him. Although I was already retired, and he was the current prime minister. He spoke Russian because he studied with us at the Institute of Energy. He said: “Nikolai Ivanovich, we met in 1990. You told me about how you look at the prospects for economic modernization. But she should have followed approximately our path...” I answered: “Not quite like that. You have your own soil, we have ours. But according to some fundamental provisions, yes, the economies are similar.” And the Chinese Prime Minister asked: “So why didn’t you follow this path and turn into an unknown direction?” So, I still think that we should have followed a path like the Chinese one, and there would have been a completely different picture.
But at first you and Gorbachev had complete mutual understanding?
- No, it was not. He was unhappy that I was taking my clear position. There was no warmth in our relationship. But until 1987, I sincerely supported him, because I believed that he could do a lot for the country.
But there were battles in the Politburo. I read it and almost got to the point of swearing...
- And to the squeal, and to the mat. When, at my request, even at my demand, the issue of an anti-alcohol campaign was raised at the Politburo. After all, then we saw that something incredible was happening with alcohol matters! I asked Mikhail Sergeevich twice or three times to consider this issue at the Politburo, which has become worse than ever. On the one hand, people are terribly unhappy - queues, crush. On the other hand, Solomentsev and Ligachev are punishing my ministers because, let’s say, this month they sold 1% more cognac than last month. But we were losing a lot of money. Gorbachev said, okay, okay, we’ll figure it out, but he himself did nothing.
And then there were fights when you were against the shock price release, and after that you decided to leave...
“There were two reasons for my leaving. Firstly, I understood that the 500 days program was winning. That is, the point of view that suggested shock therapy, those arguments. I remember telling someone from the team of young reformers: “What are you doing? After all, people will die!” And he answers: “Nothing, let them jump. Someone will break their head on the asphalt, and someone will fall into the water.” He didn't care that the country would break its head. At the beginning of December, three weeks before the Congress of People's Deputies, I announced that I would no longer work and that after the congress I would resign. I categorically do not accept what Gorbachev is going to do. This will be scary for the country. The country is not ready for this! The 90s showed everything...
And the second reason is the destruction of the country. I told everyone: “Stop, you can’t, having such separatist aspirations, not evaluate them!” So-called democracy and openness led to all this. One on one, I told Gorbachev: “We will crumble the country!” And he said to me, Nikolai Ivanovich, you always push things.
Gaidar is ahead
Now Gaidar's supporters say that he saved the country from the threat of famine, chaos, civil war...
“Then people came who absolutely did not understand and did not know the country. Gaidar worked in the magazine "Communist" and in the newspaper "Pravda". Nechaev worked in some institute or laboratory, Chubais, I don’t know where he worked, also Shokhin, Aven... There were six people there, and they did not undergo any kind of work - neither factory, nor state, nor territorial work in the republics or regions ! And here in Moscow they did not hold government positions. That is, they were absolutely far from the real economy. Yes, they read a lot of books, and the Americans came here, dozens of some people wore jeans and commanded, like, do this and that, they introduced vouchers and other nonsense. These people, the young reformers, did not have the right to do all this. Yes, Yeltsin had to recruit someone, and yes, he had no choice. But he had to call us (not me personally, but people who understood what was what), but he didn’t want to. This is politics...
And we followed the Polish path...
— Back in 1987, we quarreled with Gorbachev - precisely on the issue of further economic development. He proposed, starting in 1988, to do what Gaidar did on January 2, 1992: let go of prices, eliminate planning, etc. We then talked very seriously. I said: “Either you accept our concept of a gradual transition, or I’m leaving, I won’t work, and you do what you want. This will be a terrible harm for the state!” Then Gorbachev agreed, but then Gaidar did it!
Now a monument has been erected to him at the Higher School of Economics. Would you erect a monument to Gaidar?
- To him? Of course not. He ruined the country and people, so what now? Rejoice at the theory that he adopted and which has been in effect for these 15 years? Why are they playing the fool, making him a savior? Pensioners were not given money for six months, pensioners went into garbage dumps!.. And today they say that he saved the country!? Yes, they, together with Yeltsin, humiliated the country, let it down, as the thieves say.
Your detractors criticize you for creating a loophole for cooperatives and private ownership in 1988. Do you regret it now?
“I remember everything perfectly and now I think it should have been done.” Another thing is that initially one idea was laid down, and then the Congress of People’s Deputies and the new Supreme Council appeared, completely different people appeared and led in a different direction. Before making such a decision, we didn’t just start from scratch. We have a rich, powerful country, a powerful economy. I have always imagined it as such boulders-pyramids - this is metallurgy, this is mechanical engineering, this is the military-industrial complex, this is chemistry... But between them there are voids, and they were supposed to be filled with consumer goods, what the people need. During the war and after the war, the people reluctantly put up with everyday hardships. But the moment came when it was necessary to live differently. I believed that with the help of cooperation we could fill these niches, but heavy industry would never be able to do this. This was our task, and it was for this purpose that we passed the law. But in 1989-1990, the loudmouths spread cooperation and made it possible to create cooperatives directly in factories. Here the products are made by a factory, the state, and there by a cooperative, and the result was a complete imbalance. What about the financial side of this issue? No, the idea was right. Of course, one can criticize and ask why we switched to market relations? But we have always said that government regulation is needed! We understood perfectly well, studied the French and English experience, and everywhere about 50% are state-owned enterprises. And we thought it should be about the same. The military-industrial complex and heavy industry must remain in the hands of the state. Everything else could be given to joint stock companies, private companies, etc. Because, say, a shoe repair shop will be private, will the country come to a critical state? No, nothing will happen. This is normal.
Remember when Sobchak called you a crying Bolshevik?
- Do you really believe that the general director of Uralmash, who had 52 thousand employees (of which 43 thousand at the main plant and 9 thousand at branches), which had a social city with a population of 200 thousand people, where there were schools, hospitals, transport , 50 factory canteens... Do you really think that a “rag” can work at such a factory? God forbid, this is simply unacceptable! Yes, maybe I'm not a tyrant. I was very demanding of myself and of people, but I was also friendly when necessary.
So, if Sobchak saw how, after the earthquake in Spitak, where I arrived, a woman in black hugged me somewhere in the mountains, and tears welled up in my eyes, is this a moral crime? Well, who is he himself after that?
The West is rubbing its hands
You have known Yeltsin from the Urals for a long time. Has your attitude towards him changed over time?
- He was always the same. Only then did he start drinking more. You see, this man was very strong in destruction. And not only in Moscow, not only in the capital’s party organization, when he was rampaging here and people were jumping from floors. Wherever he worked, he destroyed everything. Although he is a builder by training, and it seemed that he should be a creator. But it was precisely in creation that he was absolutely weak, he did not understand the mechanisms of action. That’s how it is with the country: I have a feeling that this power fell to him, and he didn’t know what to do with it. I rushed back and forth, found this Gaidar...
There are two of them - he and Gorbachev. Great power was contraindicated for both of them. This was our mistake, including mine. I also supported Gorbachev when he came to power in 1985. And others supported him, but he couldn’t be installed because he was simply not suited for this! Now, if there was a preacher position in the country, he would do a great job! He would talk and talk for hours... But to govern, to lead the country in a planned and balanced manner... He is very impulsive, disorganized. And Yeltsin is also contraindicated for great power, though for other reasons: he is a destroyer.
Is some form of reintegration possible? Well, okay, the Balts, everything is clear with them, although they come to us for gasoline. But other republics - Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus... We are neighbors.
— With the Balts, I think it’s really useless. These are the kind of people who will always have someone under their wing. They were under our wing, sucked us as much as they could, walked around in bast shoes, and then became normal. Today they have the Americans and the West, that is, they have always been tied to someone, and it is useless for us to continue talking with them. But everyone else... My personal opinion is that it is unrealistic today to recreate the Soviet Union in the form in which it was, even if I really wanted it. This will be a war between republics. Of course, something needs to be done, and we can’t leave it like that. We need to create something close to the European Union. Each country there seems to be independent - the same France, Belgium, Germany, but there are general principles by which they live. For example, it's been more than 40 years since they created a unified organization for coal and steel. Now, step by step, they have reached a single currency. They do not sit still, they have a parliament, some decisions are made. Yes, this is a boring matter, you need the consent of all members... But with independent states, they pursue a single policy.
We have scattered in different directions, and no one here is trying to pursue a unified policy. In the CIS, which will soon be 18 years old, we only have some general principles, that’s all. Kravchuk and everyone else, by creating the CIS, essentially created a club for divorces. They were terribly afraid of some kind of supranational structure. What we have in Europe - parliament, executive power. They were terribly afraid: they say, you will infringe on us, suppress us, etc. I’m not saying that we need to repeat the path of Europe one for one. But taking into account the specifics, something similar should be done. But there is one “but”. There, Türkiye is pulling in one direction, Germany in the other. And these republics are pulling us apart, so they don’t see the need to group. There is a crude but correct saying: “Until the roast rooster pecks in one place, nothing will happen.” If this cockerel pecks for some reason, then everyone will come and say: “Let's live together. Separately it is impossible.” But what kind of rooster it will be when it pecks is unknown.
And the West is rubbing its hands: how good it is that Russia has a conflict with Georgia! What's left for us now - just an oil pipeline?
— Unfortunately, yes, gas, pipe. We talked about this a long time ago, when big money appeared due to wildly soaring prices. Of course, it was necessary to invest in the processing industry, in the real sector of the economy. I understand that this money saved the country from the crisis. But I don’t think they were specially saved for this. Who thought it would erupt? By the way, scientists knew, they warned for a long time... This money should not have been kept in the West in America at 2%, but invested here! We need to build roads, give preferential loans to factories, for modernization, to replace equipment... I shudder to think, why do we need to join the WTO, and what will happen when we join there? This will be something incredible for us! This will end with businesses closing left and right. The textile industry will not survive, light industry too, etc. Yes, it really needs to be modernized. But not the country as a whole, but specifically.
How much longer will Soviet equipment last?
- Let's do some arithmetic. Today we have 70% of outdated equipment. So consider it. We'll last a few more years. It is no longer suitable today. We are still doing something for internal consumption. But we are no longer able to compete at a serious global level.
DOSSIER
Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov. Born on September 28, 1929 in Ukraine, in the village of Dyleevka, Donetsk region, in a working-class family. Graduated from the Kramatorsk Mechanical Engineering College and the Ural Polytechnic Institute. Since 1950 he worked at the Ural Machine-Building Plant named after. Sergo Ordzhonikidze (now Uralmash Production Association) as a foreman, then a foreman, a shop manager, a chief welding technologist, a chief engineer, and a general director. Since 1975 - First Deputy Minister of Heavy and Transport Engineering of the USSR. In 1985-1990 - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. In 1991, he ran for the post of President of the RSFSR and received more than 15% of the votes, finishing second after Yeltsin. Since 2003 - representative of the administration of the Belgorod region in the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Married, has a daughter, as well as a grandson and granddaughter.
It has long been known that extremes are our national trait. Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, while heading the government of the USSR, he tried to find a middle ground. As a result, our hero incurred the dislike of both reformers, who considered him a retrograde, and conservatives, who reproached Ryzhkov for radicalism. Whether Nikolai Ivanovich was right or wrong is for historians to judge. But without the memories of the former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the history of perestroika would be incomplete.
- Nikolai Ivanovich, your government is not listed in the Guinness Book of Records?
Apparently not. What are you talking about?
- Well, how? Ryzhkov's government was the first and last in the history of the country, which was elected by parliament and which voluntarily resigned.
I haven't thought much about it, but it seems so. It was truly a unique time. In fact, we had a parliamentary republic for less than a year - in 1989-1990. My ministers were confirmed in parliament in a secret vote. And resignation... In December 1990, at the presidential council, I posed the question bluntly: “How to live further? Yeltsin says one thing, we say another.” After the meeting I came to my office - all my deputies were sitting and waiting. We discussed the situation for another two hours. My comrades frankly said: “There will be no conversation: for our opponents today, the worse, the better. Let’s look at things realistically: we worked honestly and honestly we must leave.” We wrote a letter to Gorbachev stating that all attempts to organize the life of the country are either ignored or met with resistance and we declare our intention to resign.
- Gorbachev didn’t hint to you about this before?
Everything was clear even without hints. He needed to get away from me. In the second half of 1990, a kind of triumvirate formed in power: Gorbachev, Ryzhkov and Yeltsin. In this structure I found myself, as they say, the third wheel. The forces that stood behind Yeltsin brought the full blow down on me, leaving Gorbachev to take the cake. In early December 1990, I talked with the president and told him that the limit of compromise had come and I was leaving at the beginning of the year, after the congress. He named two reasons: firstly, the reforms that Yeltsin is starting are catastrophic for the country, and secondly, I cannot resist the destruction of the Soviet Union, but I also do not want to be an accomplice in this process. I think after these words Gorbachev breathed a sigh of relief, although he said diplomatically: “Nikolai, maybe you should work some more?”
- Did you end up in the hospital?
Yes. With a heart attack. Gorbachev came to my room on January 12, 1991. He got scared looking at me. To be honest, I didn’t even recognize myself in the mirror. Soon his shock passed, we sat down at the table and began drinking tea and sandwiches. I said again that I was leaving. He asked me to find a job in some public organizations. Gorbachev assured that he would help, but, as usual, he did not keep his word. There was a conversation about my replacement. Mikhail Sergeevich asked who I recommend. I asked him to name his candidates. He says: “What about Oleg Baklanov?” I answer: “A good person, but a very narrow specialist. Mainly in space. I’m not sure that he is able to cover the entire economy.” - “What do you think of Valentin Pavlov?” I answer: “Yes, the same. He’s a good financier, but that’s not enough in such a position. Besides, he has one sin.” Gorbachev: "Which one?"
I think he knew exactly what I was talking about. We knew Valentin’s weakness from the State Planning Committee. The guys told me that he could be out for up to four days. We turned a blind eye to this because we valued him as a financier, but the post of prime minister is too responsible a position. And then I asked: “Why don’t you want to appoint Nazarbayev?” Gorbachev replied that he had finally made up his mind and would lead the republic. In parting, I asked not to make any decisions while I was in the hospital. He promised again. And soon I learned from my sister at the hospital about Pavlov’s appointment... They didn’t want to disturb me and cut off everything - the radio, the TV, they didn’t let me read the newspapers.
- Just like Lenin in Gorki...
Yeah. True, my wife came to see me regularly. And, by the way, it was she who told me that Yanaev became vice-president at the congress at the end of December 1990. I say: “This can’t be!” And then I thought to myself: “Well, I didn’t pick a deputy!” Perhaps Gorbachev specifically selected weak people. The discussion of Pavlov’s candidacy took place, as I later learned, at a meeting with the heads of the republics. In my opinion, Valentin was appointed precisely under pressure from the republican leaders, and above all Boris Yeltsin. They were all interested in not having a strong prime minister in the USSR.
The late Yuri Dmitrievich Maslyukov, who was both my first deputy and Pavlov’s, told me that at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers under the conditions of the State Emergency Committee, the prime minister was already completely drunk. He began to mutter something incomprehensible. Maslyukov suggested calling a break. Pavlov became indignant, and then took a pistol out of his pants, opened the desk drawer and pointedly threw it there. They finally announced a break, and he was literally dragged out of the office. Valentin never showed up at work again. By the way, as soon as he took over my office, the first thing he did was put a refrigerator in his rest room, where he kept a supply of whiskey. I've never had a refrigerator. During more than five years of being prime minister, no one in my office drank a glass of alcohol!
- Your former boss, Chairman of the State Planning Committee Nikolai Baibakov, said that you and him at work, at least once, drank vodka.
This is an interesting story. But in fact, this did not happen in the Council of Ministers, but in the State Planning Committee of the USSR. My boss, Nikolai Konstantinovich Baibakov, I consider him my teacher, was an amazing person. But too carried away and gullible. I was always interested in some not very proven discoveries, paranormal phenomena and all sorts of mysticism. For example, I learned about some kind of miraculous magnetic water - and spent months talking about how to use it to increase productivity. We even asked the President of the Academy of Sciences, Anatoly Alexandrov, for advice, but he was quite skeptical about this idea. Radioactive water, he said, really promotes growth.
Baibakov had many such hobbies. The same Djuna Davitashvili. After all, it was he who pulled her into the higher spheres! I once went to see him on some business, and Brezhnev called him. I hear Baibakov’s words: “Yes, Leonid Ilyich... Juna helps people, but she hasn’t helped me yet.” Apparently, Brezhnev had already heard something about the healer and asked for advice from the chief specialist in miracles. By the way, I personally saw pictures of Juna’s energy field. This made a strong impression even on me...
So, Baibakov also decided to experiment on me. There was such a “inventor” of all trades (he died in prison) - Hunt or Khint. I don't remember exactly. One day Nikolai Konstantinovich calls me, begins to talk about a new miracle drug and takes out from the table two bottles with a liquid as white as milk. Opens one - a terrible stench! I was taken aback. I ask: what is this? He quietly says: “Take it! This is a cure for cancer.” I immediately: “No, no. Why the hell do I need this elixir? Hide it, Nikolai Konstantinovich. I won’t even come close to it.”
I don’t know anything about the fate of this brainchild. But soon Baibakov became interested in the fight against drunkenness and again called me as an accomplice. He says: “Do you know how much money we lose on Monday, when workers come home with a hangover after the weekend?” I answer: “I know perfectly well. When I worked at Uralmash, we kept records of electricity consumption at substations. Judging by these graphs, on Monday before lunch and on Friday after lunch, people clearly have no time for work.” Baibakov was very happy that he had found an understanding person in me: “I had scientists. They invented vodka, which completely eliminates hangovers! We must support them. What a saving this will be for the national economy!”
He immediately presses the button to contact the secretary and asks him to prepare sandwiches with cheese and sausage. The appetizer is served, and Baibakov commands: “Let’s go!” I tried to resist. I say: “Damn it, my head will hurt. Besides, we didn’t have lunch.” He called me Thomas the unbeliever, and in the end I gave up. We settled down in the rest room. They took a 0.75 liter bottle and began to “persuade” her.
We said goodbye in a great mood. I wake up in the morning... Well, how can I describe it to you?.. My head is square. It's cracking. Terrible pain. I remember with “kind” words everything at once: scientific progress, the fight for sobriety in production and the specific inventors of the miracle vodka. It's good that it was on Sunday - I didn't have to go to work. In general, the whole day was spent. The next morning, at eleven, Baibakov calls me to a meeting on some issue with the participation of a third party. When this third one came out, I almost ran into my “drinking buddy”: “Either you stuff your face with this Mendeleev, or I’ll stuff it myself. I almost gave him an oak!” Baibakov admitted that he had a similar effect... He was as trusting of innovations as a child. When I tried to put him down, he always got offended. Here was another case...
It has long been noted that if apples fall to the ground during a thunderstorm, they are preserved much better. Scientists have concluded that ozone kills many microbes. Baibakov became hooked on this cause and began promoting the idea of equipping vegetable storage facilities with ozone units. He gave me the task of developing special equipment. The idea seemed tempting, he began to put pressure on the performers, and they referred to scientists who said that the influence of ozone should be tested on humans. He says that they have already checked, what to pull? And they told him again: no and no. It is necessary not just to check on a person, but to find out how this will affect the offspring or in two generations, whether there will be a mutation. As a result, this idea also died out. The beginning of the 80s is a completely different era...
- Let's go back to 1990. Is it true that back in the summer you suggested that Mikhail Sergeevich resign from the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and become honorary chairman of the party?
Yes, it happened. By the way, he agreed at that moment. Several people approached me, among whom were the head of the USSR Presidential Staff Valery Boldin and the Secretary of the Central Committee Oleg Shenin. Everything was done openly. Naturally, I did not offer myself for the post of Secretary General during the conversation. Although I know that there were conversations behind my back that I could become one. Just like in March 1990, when the presidential elections took place. I was convinced that Gorbachev was by this time disliked by most party members. I thought that when he left the first roles and remained a figurehead, the situation might improve. The conversation was calm, he agreed.
And the next morning the bell rings, and Gorbachev says to me in a raised voice: “What are you planning to make of me? A doll? Forget about our conversation. I will never do this!” I responded: “Mikhail Sergeevich, you are in vain to react like that. This is not just my proposal. But in general, look. It looks like all this will end badly...”
You know, a fissure in the relationship between the top officials of the state appeared back in 1987, when there was a discussion about the economic model, and in particular around the draft law on state-owned enterprises. I was of the opinion that it was necessary to maintain the state order at sixty percent. I was under a lot of pressure from the market people - Alexander Yakovlev and Vadim Medvedev - and I was eventually forced to tell Gorbachev that his actions in the event of a sharp liberalization of the economy, cancellation of plans for the commissioning of roads, housing and other social facilities would be simply illegal, since comply with the decisions of the last party congress. The conflict has been dragging on since that time. For the first time, open confrontations began at the Politburo, almost leading to massacres. The cracks that appeared then never healed. It seems to me that Gorbachev was somehow jealous of the way I was treated in the country and in the party. This was especially evident after the earthquake in Armenia at the end of 1988, when I myself felt that many people had a very good attitude towards me.
- But you yourself wanted to become secretary general, and then president of the USSR?
If I wanted, I could be president. At the Third Congress of People's Deputies, elections for the head of state were held. Gorbachev's candidacy was supported at a plenum of the Central Committee two days before the congress. But at the congress, quite unexpectedly, my candidacy was nominated by the Union group and the farmers. If I had agreed, I would have won by secret ballot. This is not a matter of my immodesty: believe me, this would actually happen. But I was very afraid of a split and recused myself. Some will follow Gorbachev, others will follow Ryzhkov... I was a devout communist. My conscience is clear. It is possible that the country, if it had agreed to the proposal of the deputies, would have taken a different path. Or maybe they would just kill me. I don't rule it out.
And you say: parliamentary republic! By the way, several years ago, during a meeting with Vladimir Putin, he himself started a conversation with me about the experience of perestroika and democratization: “Nikolai Ivanovich, now there is a lot of talk about a parliamentary republic, what do you think of this idea?” I think he deliberately provoked me. I replied: “We have experience. Only nine months. We were then convinced that we had not matured to democracy in all respects. Even if you now try to create a parliamentary republic, we will first chatter and then lose Russia. Maybe , in fifty years we’ll be mature.” Russia is a special country...
- How did you even get into the nomenklatura of the CPSU Central Committee?
When the issue of my appointment as director of Uralmash was being decided in 1971, approval went through the Central Committee. The mechanical engineering department of the CPSU Central Committee was headed by a very good person - Vasily Semenovich Frolov, with whom I had known for a long time. And the department was supervised by Politburo member Andrei Pavlovich Kirilenko. So in 1979, when I was appointed to the State Planning Committee, I was already listed in the Politburo nomenklatura. By the way, I terribly resisted this appointment. He bypassed everyone except Brezhnev. At that time, the post of Minister of Defense Industry was vacant, and there was a rumor that I could be appointed there. I already internally agreed with this. And then powerful pressure begins: everything, in the State Planning Committee, the issue is resolved. As a result, in January 1979, this happened.
The meeting was chaired by Brezhnev. He was already pretty bad. It seems that he was informed that I was not really keen on this position, and he said: “Well, you got caught. What do you say?” I answer: “Leonid Ilyich, to be honest, I’m not ready for this work yet, but if you approve me, I will master a new direction.” Brezhnev immediately ended the conversation: “Okay, comrades, let’s wish him success.” At the State Planning Committee I became the first deputy for general issues. There I got two nicknames - First and Svodnik, since I had to bring all sectors of the national economy into a single plan.
- How do you feel about Leonid Ilyich?
If Brezhnev had left in 1975, I think he would have left a good impression of him. I saw the reign of Nikita Khrushchev at the plant and I can say that we are tired of it. I can imagine how tired of him they are in Moscow. We were simply delayed. When Brezhnev appeared... Well, how can I tell you? We just started working normally. And the members of the Politburo, candidates for Politburo members, and secretaries of the Central Committee are to blame for the fact that he did not leave on time. These assholes forced a sick, barely walking man to remain at his post. These celestials needed him. Why be surprised: they thought only about themselves.
- There is a version that Andropov called Gorbachev his successor in an official document, but they decided to hide this phrase from the text from members of the Central Committee...
When they talk about this, they refer to the words of Andropov’s late assistant Arkady Ivanovich Volsky, but I don’t believe in this story. I visited Andropov in the hospital at the end of January 1983, a couple of weeks before his death. In mid-January, I was sent with a group of comrades to the Congress of the Communist Party of Austria. After the business trip, I had to write a report. I wrote it, but due to Andropov’s absence I didn’t know who to give it to. I called Chernenko, who is the second person in the party, and said: “Konstantin Ustinovich, I wrote a report. Where should I send this note?” Chernenko was even happy: “Oh, it’s good that you called me! Yuri Vladimirovich recently asked about you. Call him at the hospital.”
I called. Andropov invited me that same day to visit him at the Central Clinical Hospital at five o’clock in the evening. He was lying on the third floor in the infectious diseases building. I entered the room. Yuri Vladimirovich was sitting in a chair near the bed in white flannelette pajamas with red stripes. We said hello. He offered me tea and ordered juice for himself. It was striking that there was a straw in the glass of juice. I later realized that due to the strong tremors he could not drink otherwise. He began to talk about the business trip, and he: well, they say, I went - and it’s good. And he started asking about the economy. He was interested in the work of the Gorbachev-Dolgikh-Ryzhkov group, which he created in December 1982 to prepare economic reforms. I reported everything in detail, but I felt that my twenty minutes were long over - the doctors warned me - and asked permission to end the conversation. He agreed. I collected the papers in a folder and began to say goodbye. Andropov says: “Wait.” While sitting, he extended one hand to me to shake, and the other tilted my head towards him, kissed me and said: “Go.”
- Who did Andropov treat better, you or Gorbachev?
It seemed to me that it was coming to me.
- But unlike Gorbachev, you never became a candidate or a member of the Politburo under him.
Of the fifteen months of his work, he spent five in the hospital. He didn't have time to do a lot of things. In any case, I communicated with him regularly both by phone and in person.
By the way, in 1987 I ended up in the same ward after a serious accident in Barvikha. The newspapers didn't write about her. It was not accepted then. The ZIL in which I was traveling, and the ZIL with its guards were written off as scrap metal after it. Here is how it was.
My convoy consisted of three cars: a Volga - the so-called leader - and two ZILs. That's all. By the way, Gorbachev’s convoy was only one ZIL longer, in which they carried a suitcase with a nuclear button. I was driving along Rublyovka to Moscow. When we passed Barvikha in the place where a wooden temple has now been built, a PAZ bus was going in the opposite direction. Apparently, having seen the leading car, the PAZ began to press to the right and pulled over to the side of the road. Then he suddenly hit the ditch with his rear wheel and turned straight towards us. Then it turned out that the driver was a nineteen-year-old soldier who had served six months in the army and was driving his colleagues and officers somewhere. My driver Maksimych managed to avoid a head-on collision, but we plowed the entire side of the bus with our right side. Plus, our security car flew into us from behind. Glass fell down. I was thrown forward, where the stools for the translators were located. They were bound at the edges with metal. And I rested my chin exactly on these pieces of iron. He hit his knees and ended up on the floor. The doors, fortunately, were not jammed. The driver jumped out of his, opened mine, and I started from there, covered in blood, literally crawling out on all fours. There were four security men with me. I have one in my car and three in the second ZIL. Only 12 people. They worked three shifts.
- It’s somehow undignified, Nikolai Ivanovich...
Yes, the level of security for top officials is now completely different. So here it is. The three of them had one diplomat in which automatic weapons were stored. One of them immediately pulled the shutter and, using profanity, ordered everyone from the PAZ to lie face down on the ground. I heard him shout that if he disobeyed, he would shoot to kill. A man jumped up: “Nikolai Ivanovich, I’m a doctor! Let me help.” I refused. I waited until the “leader” returned, and they rushed me to the Central Clinical Hospital. So I ended up in Andropov’s ward and already remembered it well. Thank God, no one was injured in the accident, nothing serious was found on me, and I was discharged fairly quickly.
“Our Version” continues the series of publications dedicated to famous politicians and public figures of the modern history of Russia. This time, former Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Nikolai Ryzhkov agreed to answer the questions of the Our Version correspondent. It’s surprising, but he still remembers the prices for products that were both during the USSR and after the so-called shock therapy. For example, he knows exactly how many times the cost of cheesecakes, “which Russians snacked on in those days,” has increased.
– Nikolai Ivanovich, some of your colleagues and associates have long been retired, others manage various kinds of funds, or even advertise pizza, but you are still in demand. You work in the Federation Council. How do you manage to stay, as they say, afloat?
– After my resignation in 1991, I no longer worked in the executive authorities. But in 1993, he began to deal with the problems of the Prokhorovsky field in the Belgorod region, where the famous tank battle took place in 1943. It was a difficult time then: our entire past was criticized indiscriminately. But after 1.5 years we already built the first stage of the memorial complex there. Then I was offered to become a deputy, and I ran for office twice from the Belgorod region. And now it’s almost five years since I’ve been a senator. What inspired me? I thought then that I can’t sit at home and read books all the time...
– You have enormous experience. You were the prime minister of such a country... However, after your resignation, you probably had to reconsider your view on many things?
– I made a clear conclusion for myself: I will not join any party again. This is a promise I made to myself and still keep. And I had no ambitions for, say, the post of president or a position in the government.
– But you ran for the post of President of Russia in 1991, when Boris Yeltsin also ran for this position at the same time as you. And they scored 10%, and this was during the wild popularity of Boris Nikolaevich.
– So it was back in 1991, and I made a vow to big politics later.
I don’t go there anymore, but I went to parliament and do the maximum of what is possible in my position to do for the country. I continue to serve my Motherland. Of course, I received a variety of offers, but I rejected them. I didn’t intend to run from one party to another, although I know people who changed them during this time, probably about five. But can you trust people if they change parties like gloves?
– How do you now assess the time of perestroika?
– I sincerely wanted changes to begin to occur in our country. The system that has existed since the 30s of the last century has served our state greatly. We won the war, after it we restored the country, created a strong industry, etc. But when it was necessary to make changes in our economic policy, they did not follow. Kosygin began the reform in 1965, and it gave a certain outlet (I even saw its results at the plant where I worked), but in the early 70s the reform died out.
In November 1982, I was elected secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and then Yuri Andropov invited me, Gorbachev and Dolgikh and said the following words: “Everyone is talking about reform. And what is it? Many books and articles have been written, but there is no government document so that one can clearly imagine the direction of movement.” And we started working on it. But then Andropov died, and Chernenko had no time for that: he was seriously ill. And already in 1985 this reform was called perestroika.
– That is, the initiator of perestroika was Yuri Vladimirovich?
– Yes, it was he who gave impetus to these processes. Well, then you know. In the late 80s – early 90s, I proposed a soft transition to the market. After all, our entire economy and management institutions were built based on a planned system, but it was necessary to switch to a market system, socially oriented, but with state regulation. I believed that this would take at least eight years, but there were people who said that it could be done in 500 days, and, unfortunately, they were the ones who were believed.
– Now, years later, I just want to ask if it was not the United States that launched the algorithm to destroy our country, and Gorbachev listened to advisers from there?
– At the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1985, the principles of economic reform were formulated. Gorbachev published in his report all the developments that were made under Andropov. So, in my opinion, at first it was unlikely that there were any advisers from outside, because we ourselves believed that reforms should begin with the economy.
And then, I think, advisers were found. How they advised - directly or through some persons (whom we, by the way, know) - I don’t know, but I believe that several such actions were deliberately carried out in our country, which not only ruined perestroika, but generally led to the creation ungovernable state.
Wherever reforms are carried out, there is strong state power, for example in China. The authorities must hold the steering wheel firmly, especially at first.
But the mistake that Gorbachev succumbed to was definitely inspired from overseas: we had not yet finished reforming the economy, but had already decided to change the system of government. But in the end they simply undermined the entire state.
– Why do you think Gorbachev is so loved in the West, but we have, to put it mildly, the opposite attitude towards him?
- Because he destroyed our country. Do you think they didn’t dream about it there? And what decisions and documents were made by the CIA... They were always afraid and hated us because we were strong. There was a bipolar world then. For example, they got into Vietnam - we gave them a hand, we got into Afghanistan - they gave it to us. But there was still a balance.
– Could the USSR be kept from collapse?
– It was possible and necessary – if not for Gorbachev. Now, if Andropov had lived for some more time, at least 5–10 years, then we would, of course, have followed the Chinese option. But, unfortunately, God did not let him live.
– What do you consider Gorbachev’s achievement and his main mistake?
“I think it’s our mistake, including mine, that we supported Gorbachev. But understand, 2.5 years pass, during which three general secretaries die: Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko. That is, there is one continuous funeral, and then a person appears who walks normally and can speak without a piece of paper. Here, of course, everyone perked up, because before him there were all elders. We were confident in him, although when he spoke, sometimes we did not understand what he was talking about.
By the way, then I concluded for myself that Gorbachev could become a very good preacher. But he, of course, could not manage a state where wisdom, balance and gradualism are needed. You can’t constantly tug at a country in which almost 300 million people live! In a family, you can quarrel with your wife and children, but is it really possible to do this to the country? And he grabs onto one thing, another, a third... I told him many times that our country is a huge inertial mechanism. We will make a decision, and these papers will only be delivered to Kamchatka by reindeer in two months.
– Did Raisa Maksimovna have a lot of ideas? It was rumored that she also came up with the anti-alcohol campaign?
- There is no need to sin against a person. She, of course, had a certain influence that we are unlikely to know, but I am convinced that the anti-alcohol campaign was not her invention. Its authors are two people: Ligachev and the late Solomentsev. To be more precise, the CPSU Central Committee already had such an idea. A few years earlier, a commission was created on this issue, headed by Pelshe. But he understood that the anti-alcohol campaign was a minefield and it was not worth going there, and Arvid Yanovich put the brakes on this matter.
– You and Yeltsin have known for a long time. Can you compare his “early” and “late” ones?
– Yes, I knew him since 1968. He and I graduated from the same institute, and now two memorial plaques hang on its facade. I was the chief engineer of the plant, and he, it seems, was the head of the construction trust in Sverdlovsk. Then he became the head of the construction department in the regional committee, and we even became friends as families. And in Moscow, he and I communicated normally with each other. And our relations became irreconcilable when he headed the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and went to destroy the central government. He was just like a battering ram and could destroy anything.
So it’s in vain to sing Yeltsin’s praises today. He was in power from 1991 to 1999, and at that time I was in the State Duma. Yeltsin made a large number of various proposals, but nothing worked, because there was neither peace nor political stability in the country,
But another person came and step by step strengthened the power. Some people like it, others do not accept the “vertical of power”, but under Putin stability has appeared. And the USSR under Putin would not have collapsed.
– The rightists strongly criticize the current course...
– What else can they say? Their song is over. After the destructive steps they took in the 90s, people realized that the country did not need liberal talkers...
From the biography: Born September 28, 1929. Dyleevka, Dzerzhinsky district, Donetsk region, 1950-1959. - mechanic, shift foreman, site manager, 1959-1965. - shop manager, chief welder, deputy director, 1965-1970. - chief engineer, 1970-1971. - Director at the Ural Heavy Metal Plant ... Read completely
– Nikolai Ivanovich, you have a certain polish of a gentleman that is not typical for the party nomenklatura. Where did you get this from?
– The fact that it was not inherited is certain, because I come from a simple mining family. There, you know, there was nothing gentlemanly there.
External things - behavior, the ability to choose clothes, the ability to talk - are acquired in life. Some dress so that their clothes are conspicuous, like parrots. There are slobs, dirty and indecently dressed. For example, I will never wear a yellow or orange suit, like Zhirinovsky. I love plain ones, a little lighter. But this taste has been developed over many years. Maybe I'm conservative in this, but being conservative isn't that bad. No one gives me advice on choosing clothes except my wife and daughter.
As for colloquial speech, when I worked at the factory, I was not an angel. The literary language was not very much used there. But my speech has never been particularly clogged. My friends are even surprised - a person with such work experience, with such experience does not scream, does not yell, does not bang his fist and does not swear.
It's all from upbringing. But first of all, a person must do this himself. If he respects himself, then he should be able to control himself.
– Many, having reached great heights in life, try to forget about their past, that “we all came from the people.” Who is easier for you to communicate with today – with your colleagues in the Duma or with ordinary people?
“It’s better for me to communicate with ordinary people.”
-And you understand him, common people?
– I understand perfectly. It is better to communicate with ordinary people because they are more accessible. Also, probably because ten years ago, when I retired, I returned to where I came from. There was a period when I had not yet left there and returned here, but then I said to myself: “Listen, what are you worried about? After all, you have returned to where you came from.” I returned to the people from which I came.
Where did I come to power from? From ordinary people, from a simple family. I lived in the same house where other workers lived, walked along the same streets along which thousands of other Uralmash workers walked. Then they invited me to work in Moscow. He worked for four years in the State Planning Committee, three years in the Central Committee of the Party, five years in the Council of Ministers. Of course, there was great isolation from the people. I had to move among officials, among the elite, so to speak. But it is impossible to say that working in the positions I worked in Moscow meant being close to the people. And to be honest, when I resigned, at first, as I already said, I was very worried, I won’t lie. But then I calmed down - after all, I returned to where I came from.
After retirement, he began to engage in public work - he helped in the creation of a memorial complex on Prokhorovsky Field. In 1995 he became a State Duma deputy. Please note that I was not elected from a list, but from a single-mandate constituency. Two hundred thousand people voted for me - Belgorod and ten other districts.
Now I go there every month and meet with people. Imagine, sometimes four to five hundred people gather in a club. They ask questions, we talk. I feel better with them.
- Why is it easier?
– Ordinary people... They are simpler, more honest. He's not as sophisticated, but he's easier for me to talk to. Honestly, I get satisfaction from communicating with ordinary people. Not all of their questions are ideal; there are also thorny questions.
– You once briefly talked about your career – Gosplan, Central Committee, Council of Ministers. How did it progress or who moved you up this ladder?
– Then what motivated you?
- Nothing. When I was the chief engineer at Uralmash, there was such a story. My father and mother lived with us in the winter and left in the summer. And then one day he comes home and says to me: “You know, it turns out that I’m a big boss!” "Why?" – I ask him. “Yes, just now I was in the bakery, buying bread. And the people there were discussing you. Here, they say, we have a chief engineer Ryzhkov, he is thirty-five years old. And some guy said that this Ryzhkov and there is a shaggy paw, they say, his father works in the ministry and drags his son upstairs.” He talks and laughs. He's a simple miner! So I had no paws and no protection.
At the age of twenty, after graduating from college, I left my native Kramatorsk for the Urals because I wanted to see the light. I myself decided to go to Sverdlovsk, there was an institute there, I wanted to work and study further. So what kind of hand is there? I had no one in Sverdlovsk - neither friends nor relatives.
– And in Moscow no one moved you?
– So you have an ordinary career?
- Yes, an ordinary staircase. I’ll tell you again: I didn’t have any patrons.
Many people knew me as a director - both the minister and deputy ministers. They came to us in Sverdlovsk, I attended various meetings with them. It was they who made the assessment whether this person was suitable or not. Back then they took personnel very seriously. There was a whole system of personnel selection, there were personnel reserves.
When our ministry was divided into two - the Ministry of Energy Engineering and the Ministry of Heavy Transport, I was invited to the post of Minister of Heavy Transport. To be honest, I didn’t really want to go to Moscow. But there was party discipline. Four years later, the Chairman of the State Planning Committee, Baibakov, invited me to become his deputy. And again I did not agree for a long time. But he insisted: “I want you to work for me.”
Then Andropov appointed me Secretary of the Central Committee for Economics. Although we didn’t even know each other personally and I never talked to him.
– Is the fact that you became prime minister also party discipline?
- No. Before 1985, I had already worked in the Central Committee for three years. When Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the party, the Politburo discussed the question of who should be prime minister. It was then that they told me: “You were developing a new economic policy, you know how to reform the country’s economy.”
– Do you want to say that you were the developer of what was called perestroika?
– It was later that it began to be called perestroika. Before that, we spent three years developing it. True, no one still knows about this. What do you think, in March Gorbachev was elected General, and in April he already proposed the concept of perestroika? It doesn't happen that way. The time just came, and he used the material.
When the question of the prime minister was discussed, Tikhonov – the then prime minister – understood that a new leadership had arrived and it was time for him to leave. The choice fell on me.
– Nikolai Ivanovich, it is known that the path to hell is paved with good intentions. Why did it happen that perestroika was intended to improve the standard of living of Soviet people, but it turned out even worse?
– Because perestroika was betrayed.
- Who?
- Those who started it were the ones who betrayed it.
In January 1987 there was another plenum of the Central Committee. I and other members of the Politburo insisted to Gorbachev that it be formulated what we are going to do, where we are going and what perestroika is. By the way, it was journalists who came up with the term “perestroika”.
We told him: “Let’s finally formulate what perestroika is. Why do each of us understand this differently? And the plenum determined this. If I'm not mistaken, then there were seven postulates, or seven provisions, of perestroika. If you bring them to me now, I will sign them. They said that we would not change the social system, they talked about improving socialism. Who was against this?! I myself was in favor of the need to improve the state or party structure. Those documents did not say a word that the party should be dissolved.
– So you think that the party did not slow down perestroika?
- Wait, that's not what you're asking me about.
- Sorry.
– What I was talking about was formulated. I will sign those decisions today. But! Gradually, year after year - 1988, 1989 - we began to move away from these decisions. It was later that Gorbachev said: “Could I then speak openly about my thoughts? Then they would have given me a hat.” That is, it is now clear: he was already planning to change the social system.
And the intentions were not bad. If we strictly adhered to them and improved the system, it would be close to what the Chinese have been doing for twenty years.
– Former Russian Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov told me in an interview that most of the debts of today’s Russia are the debt of the USSR, which Russia took upon itself. As far as I understand, you are responsible for these debts as the former Prime Minister of the Union. Tell me, are these debts your decision or a political one?
“Then I’ll ask you a question: is it my decision to repay the debts that Khrushchev took out?” Are the debts that Kosygin took on my decision?
“But they weren’t that big.”
- Wait. Is paying back these debts my solution? And those loans that Stalin took before 1953 for the development of the national economy, for its restoration after the war...
I paid for them. Why don't you talk about this? Under Stalin, I walked under the table, but then I considered myself the successor to previous prime ministers. They also paid for past debts.
“But Stalin did not pay the tsar’s debts.”
– Do you know that they were abandoned during the revolution? It was only Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin who later gave the French four hundred million for their papers.
Each government must be responsible for the previous one. This is the law.
– But you are talking about internal loans, not external ones.
– In 1990, I decided to pay off six billion domestic debts. I could not extinguish them. I could say: “Listen, I didn’t take it. It was Stalin who took them from you. Go to him and ask him, he’s over there, lying by the Kremlin wall.” But I felt that I had to give them away.
– Nikolai Ivanovich, I asked you about the state’s external debts.
You ask Yeltsin: how did he reduce India’s debts to us by thirty percent at once? And how many debts did he forgive the former socialist countries?!
Well, okay, let it be seventy billion. But divide this by three hundred million people. Ten years have passed. Now we owe one hundred and sixteen billion. But they still add interest. If no one pays for them today, then tomorrow it will be all two hundred!
You tell me: “You have accumulated debts.” We didn't take it! And then, seventy billion out of three hundred million population is nonsense. It is they who gained fifty billion for one hundred and fifty million people in ten years. Let Zadornov not engage in nonsense! We had no problems with money. We paid immediately, hour by hour.
– Tell me, did the anti-alcohol campaign greatly undermine the budget?
- Of course, I blew it up. But this is Gorbachev... This is a separate topic.
– Did you communicate with him after his resignation?
- No. I haven't seen him for many years. Only once did I see it somewhere by accident.
But we told him not to do this. Prohibition has never brought anyone any benefit.
– Why don’t you communicate with Gorbachev? Did he offend you in some way?
- He betrayed everything. If he had only betrayed me, then God be with him. But he ruined the country, the party.
– And what do you feel sorry for – the party or the country?
- Country. Have you ever thought about this question: why did a person, without working a single day anywhere - and Gorbachev never worked anywhere for a single day, everything was only through the Komsomol line - reached the position of General Secretary? Why did this man, who was brought up absolutely on party positions, act this way towards the party? Why?! He worked there all his life! And all my life I worked in production, in the economy. This is still unclear to me.
This was the fifth column - Yakovlevs, Gorbachevs, they were all rotten. They finished the game. How many times have we warned that we shouldn’t do this or that, and in response: “You’re a conservative! This is a knife in the back of perestroika!”
- Yes, and very big. For example, Yakovlev came from the Baltic states and talks all about their “Sąjūdis”: “This is in line with perestroika.” I met him recently and said: “Remember, you told us about the Baltic states? Well, now what is it like – is it on track or not? In Latvia alone, eight hundred thousand Russians are non-citizens. This never happened even in South Africa! Did you even realize what you were saying then?”
- And what did he answer you?
- “It didn’t go that way.”
- In the wrong direction?
– Do you even communicate with anyone from the previous team today?
– Almost everyone, with a few exceptions. With the same Yegor Kuzmich, he sits not far from me in the Duma. He and I had very serious disagreements on the anti-alcohol campaign. Lukyanov and I have also been working together in the Duma for five years.
– Who did you mean when you said exceptions?
– Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Medvedev, Shevardnadze.
– What do you think, GEC members withLukyanov were they right?
“In principle, they were right that this destruction had to be stopped. But they were wrong in the way they did it. It would be better if they didn't do this then. Through their actions, they contributed to the dispersal of the party and the destruction of the country. I think today they understand that they did the wrong thing.
– When you were prime minister, what was more involved in your work – implementing the party’s policies or the economy?
– Economics.
– But the party still influenced the economy.
– At the beginning of perestroika – yes. Since about 1988, there has not been such pressure as before. The government became independent, and there was no need, as before, for any issue to be agreed upon by the Politburo. Of course, the main lines were agreed upon both at Politburo meetings and at congresses, but not in the same way as before.
– Nikolay Vasilievich Lemaev, who worked as a minister in your government, told me, and you also mentioned this, that there used to be a special school of management, special personnel were trained to manage the economy. What is their difference from today's managers?
– There was a different atmosphere before. We had a clear and precise structure of the system. It has been developed over many years.
- Why? This was a normal system for its time. There was a clear system of personnel training. This was strictly monitored.
– That is, as now, nephews or other relatives were not appointed bosses?
- They would have taken the head off for this. Previously, there was a completely different system, and here you can’t even compare.
– Nikolai Ivanovich, what kind of epic was this between you and Tveruniversalbank?
– I worked there as an adviser. I had to live somehow. Do you eat bread? And I eat. It was necessary to live. I also worked as Dobuzhiev’s deputy at the Military-Industrial Investment Company.
In 1992, Yeltsin abolished all personal pensions, and Mr. Gaidar released prices in January of the same year. Thus, my pension became equal to the pension of my grandmother, who never worked anywhere. What could I do? Should I sit on the porch? Or should I live dependent on my daughter?
I called my former deputy Dobuzhiev and asked him for a job. So he became his deputy. The Military Industrial Company had different projects. For example, the plant made automatic machines, but now it was necessary to make meat grinders. There were different projects in which it was necessary to invest money. My task was to look with an experienced eye to see if this project was fake and whether it was worth pursuing. I went to work through the checkpoint and drove a Zhiguli.
Then a banker friend invited me to work at the bank. There the salary was twice as much.
– After you left, the bank went bankrupt within a year.
- He still exists. But not as strong as before. Why are you so interested in this?
- I just asked.
– Why did you start this conversation about Tveruniversalbank? I'm not a banker or the owner of a bank. I was just an employee.
On the contrary, you have to say: fuck your mother, what is this being done - the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was brought to such a state that he was forced to become an adviser in order to earn something for his living! This doesn't bother you at all.
– You already said this yourself.
- I said it, not you. You should have said differently: “Nikolai Ivanovich, this is not very clear to me.” And you, like all journalists, need “fried” facts.
– Nikolai Ivanovich, do you think this was Yeltsin’s revenge?
- Certainly. He took everything he could. All. He made this decision.
Once, some time later, I asked Chernomyrdin: “On what basis was the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on benefits violated?” Chernomyrdin told me that there is no such resolution.
Then I told them: “You are doing all this in vain. It’s in vain that you trample on us. The time will come - you will be exactly the same and they will do to you exactly the same as you did to me.”
– The Prime Minister of the Union had great power. What was power for you - a drug or something else? And I would like to ask you about human things - what did you think, standing on the Mausoleum during parades and demonstrations, when your own portraits and portraits of your other comrades in the Politburo were carried past you?
– People get used to power. I don't know how to define it - as a drug or as alcohol, but people get used to it. And when they leave it due to various circumstances, do not believe those who say that it goes away easily. I myself experienced this condition. But then he somehow stopped: “You need to live. Was he in power? Was. Did you wear portraits? Worn. And now they won’t wear it.”
Power is a complex psychological concept. Very difficult. And it's not just about material wealth. I don’t know about others, but for me power did not lie in material wealth.
Some people like to be in awe of them. Some express themselves through power, others have industrial or political ambitions. Apparently there are those who make money from this.
– What did power mean to you?
Through power I expressed what I knew how to do. When I worked at a factory - and this is also power - it was simpler there: I made a decision, and the result was visible in a month. When I started working in Moscow, in the State Planning Committee, in the ministry, the result could appear in ten years. But I always strived to do something.
– Pardon my curiosity, I see a diary with a cross on your desk. As a non-party member, I want to ask you, as a former party member: are you still an atheist?
– I have never been an atheist, anti-religious. But I still don’t go to church. I've always been tolerant of this. My grandmother believed, and my mother prayed to God. I am of this opinion: if a person believes in God, let him believe. If only there was Vera. And the patriarch gave me this diary.
By the way, weren’t you a communist?
- No, Nikolai Ivanovich. I even left the Komsomol of my own free will.
“If I had known, I wouldn’t have talked to you at all.”
In an interview with L. Radzikhovsky (in the newspaper “New Look”, 1992) Ryzhkov recalled:
In November 1982, completely unexpectedly, I was elected secretary of the Central Committee and Andropov introduced me to the team preparing the reforms. This included Gorbachev, Dolgikh... I don’t regret this work on preparing reforms. The situation was difficult, the crisis was ripe. We began to understand the economy, and from this began perestroika in 1985, where the results of what we did in 1983-84 were practically used. If we didn't do this, it would be even worse.
(“Andropov instructed PB member Gorbachev, PB candidate Dolgikh and Central Committee Secretary for Economics Ryzhkov to carefully study the current situation in the economy and prepare proposals for its reform,” Ryzhkov wrote in his memoirs.)
In 1971, the Uralmash production association was founded, the leadership of which was entrusted to Nikolai Ryzhkov. Five factories and a research institute were united under one roof. The consortium collapsed during the time of new Russia - in 1992, each enterprise set off on an independent voyage.
After graduating from college, Nikolai Ryzhkov begins his career path. He connected his life with the Ural Machine-Building Plant. In 1950 he came to Uralmash, where he worked for 25 years. He starts as a shift foreman, then quickly moves up the career ladder: flight supervisor, shop manager, chief technologist, chief engineer, general director. At the age of 40, he was appointed head of an enterprise of union importance. Very few people manage to achieve such heights, and this testifies to the extraordinary abilities of Nikolai Ryzhkov.
Nikolai was born on September 28, 1929 in the Donbass - in the village of Dyleevka, Donetsk region, Ukrainian SSR. All men in his family worked as miners. At the beginning of the 20th century, grandfather Fyodor and his family moved to the Donbass, where he got a job at the Severny mine. Nikolai’s father, Ivan Fedorovich, and his brothers spent their entire career in mining. Nikolai’s younger brother Evgeniy served three years in the army, returned to Donbass and also connected his life with the mine, working there for almost a quarter of a century.
But Nikolai, despite such a mining pedigree, was strongly drawn to study and aviation. He entered Air Force Preparatory School several times, but the attempts were unsuccessful.
Ryzhkov Nikolai had a very difficult childhood, since during this period the country was just beginning to move away from the colossal and tragic consequences of the destructive Great Patriotic War. Of course, this state of affairs forced the guy to grow up very quickly and make his choice professionally. And so the young man entered the Kramatorsk Mechanical Engineering College at the Faculty of Mechanics. Then from 1953 to 1959. Ryzhkov Nikolay studied at the Ural Polytechnic Institute named after Kirov, from which he successfully graduated with a degree in technology and equipment for welding production.
After graduating from the Kramatorsk Mechanical Engineering College, Ryzhkov, at his own request, was sent to Sverdlovsk. From 1950 to 1975, Nikolai Ryzhkov worked in engineering and technical positions at the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant named after. Sergo Ordzhonikidze (PO "Uralmash"). From 1971 to 1975, he served as general director of the enterprise.
Ryzhkov: Firstly, I was not delighted with the word “perestroika”. The fact is that this word is not new, the Provisional Government of Kerensky had it, but journalists picked it up and away they went. I prefer the definition of “reform”. At first I was categorically for reforms, I was even one of their initiators, because my life experience and work at the factory, in the ministry and in the Central Committee of the Party showed that we had exhausted the possibilities of the economic model in which we lived before the war, during the war, after the war . A rigid planned system was extremely necessary - without it we would not have defeated the Germans, we would never have restored the national economy. They took it from someone, of course, but gave it to someone - that’s natural. But later, many, including myself, began to believe that this system had exhausted itself - it was heavily bureaucratic. How many workers do you need to keep, how many main workers, how many auxiliary workers, how many engineers, how many technicians, auxiliary workers, cleaners? I had 52 thousand workers at the plant... Therefore, we very persistently wrote that something had to be done. Before me and Gorbachev, there were already attempts at reform, for example, Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin (Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from 1964 to 1980 - Lenta.ru note), who, by the way, did a good job for his time. What he did was enormous progress, one cannot blame him for anything, and one must give him his due: he was ahead of his time. Then there was another attempt after Kosygin - they let it go.
